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PROPERTY LAW
L. Charles Long, Jr.*
While the Supreme Court of Virginia handed down decisions of
significance dealing with the ownership and operation of real prop-
erty in the Commonwealth during the past year, in most cases the
court was content to apply well-settled law in new fact situations,
or to extend the boundaries of such law gently into new territory.
The General Assembly, for its part, spent most of its energy clari-
fying existing legislation or repairing portions of statutes which, ei-
ther in operation or in prospect, needed relatively minor modifica-
tions. The foregoing statements are not intended to belittle the
cases which were decided and the legislation which was enacted
during the past year, the most significant parts of which are dis-
cussed in this article.
I. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Adverse Possession
In two cases involving claims of adverse possession, the Supreme
Court of Virginia declined to change well-settled law, and instead
focused on complicated factual situations. In Maynard v. Hibble,'
the disputed parcel of land passed by escheat sale to Maynard and
Smith when the owner of record title died intestate without known
heirs. However, in 1903 the owner of an adjacent parcel seemed to
include the disputed parcel in a conveyance of thirty-five acres to
Cooke. Upon Cooke's death, intestate, his land passed to Mary
Catherine Cooke Wilson. In 1951, Hibble bought the parcel from
Wilson in a deed describing some thirty acres (the land which
Cooke had acquired from Joseph Cooke and his wife, less some out
conveyances) on both sides of a road, which is now Route 631. The
parcel south of the road was the disputed parcel. Hibble's owner-
ship of the disputed parcel apparently was never challenged until
after the escheat sale to Maynard and Smith.
* Shareholder, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, a Professional Corporation,
Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1960 Princeton University; J.D., 1963 Harvard Law School.
1. 244 Va. 94, 418 S.E.2d 871 (1992).
2. Id. at 97, 418 S.E.2d at 873.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that, "intending to own
what the deed called for,"' Hibble paid real estate taxes on the
disputed parcel, posted it, gave third parties the right to hunt the
land, harvested timber from it and, thus, proved the required "'ac-
tual, hostile, exclusive, visible and continuous possession for the
statutory period of 15 years.' IM
In another factually similar case, however, the Supreme Court of
Virginia found that the facts did not demonstrate the requisite
hostility. In Mary Moody Northen, Inc. v. Bailey,5 Bailey claimed
adverse possession to 100 acres which were part of a 2475-acre
tract on which Mountain Lake Hotel is situated. The claimant's
father lived on the disputed parcel for most of his seventy-one-year
life. After his death, the claimant returned to the land periodically.
The court noted that although it was undisputed that Bailey lived
on the land openly and continuously during the relevant time pe-
riod with the knowledge of the record owner, told his neighbors
and children that he owned the land and gave others permission to
hunt it, there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate he did so with
the permission, or at least the sufferance, of the record land
owner.6 The supreme court noted a number of facts which it deter-
mined defeated the claim of adverse possession: the record owner
had the disputed land surveyed as part of a larger survey of his
land, with Bailey's knowledge and without Bailey's protest or in-
terference; the record owner requested Bailey to stop cutting fire-
wood and to rely instead on dead-fall, which Bailey did; and Bailey
never communicated his assertion of title to the record owner. Fur-
thermore, in one significant confrontation between the record
owner and Bailey in the early 1950s involving a fence erected by
the record owner and torn down by Bailey, the record owner
threatened to put Bailey off the land if he interfered again with
the fence.7 The Supreme Court of Virginia determined Bailey's re-
sponse8 to be more indicative of occupancy by permission than an
3. Id. at 96, 418 S.E.2d at 873.
4. Id. at 98, 418 S.E.2d at 874 (quoting McIntosh v. Chincoteague Vol. Fire Co., 220 Va.
553, 556-57, 260 S.E.2d 457, 459-60 (1979)). Hibble's cultivation of the larger parcel across
the road and his use of the disputed parcel of timber, cutting shad poles and the like distin-
guished the factual situation from that in Craig-Giles Iron Co. v. Wickline, 126 Va. 223, 101
S.E. 225 (1919), where the land was wild and uncultivated.
5. 244 Va. 118, 418 S.E.2d 882 (1992).
6. Id. at 120, 418 S.E.2d at 884.
7. Id. at 122, 418 S.E.2d at 884-85.
8. "You can't do that to me, you can't do that to me." And, with tears in his eyes, "I have
a family." Id. 418 S.E.2d at 885.
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affirmative statement of an adverse claim.9 The court rejected the
adverse possession claim since the facts failed to show that all of
the requisite elements had been satisfied. 10
B. Condemnation and Eminent Domain
In Commonwealth v. Fairbrook Business Park Associates," the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that a property owner's master de-
velopment plan can be used by the property owner to prove con-
demnation damages to the residue when the Virginia Department
of Transportation relies upon the master plan in presenting its
case.
1 2
The supreme court noted the paucity of any testimony or facts
to support an award for damage to the residue in striking such an
award in Town of Rocky Mount v. Hudson.1 The landowner's tes-
timony that the taking "has hurt me $20,000, at least,1 14 was un-
substantiated and held to be insufficient to establish value or sup-
port an award.15
C. Condominiums
In Grillo v. Montebello Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n, 6 the
Supreme Court of Virginia, interpreting Code of Virginia section
55-79.74:1, held that the association's refusal to let a condominium
owner have access to salary information for the association's em-
ployees was improper. The court found that the language of the
statute1 7 surely intended to include salary information for employ-
ees of the association as "expenditures affecting the operation and
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 244 Va. 99, 418 S.E.2d 874 (1992).
12. Id. at 104-05, 418 S.E.2d at 878 (citing Shockey v. Westcott, 189 Va. 381, 388, 53
S.E.2d 17, 20 (1949)) (noting litigant's objection to adversary's version of conversation
waived by his prior testimony of the same conversation), and distinguishing Highway &
Transp. Comm'r v. Lanier Farm, 233 Va. 506, 509, 357 S.E.2d 531, 533 (1987) and Staunton
v. Aldhizer, 211 Va. 658, 665, 179 S.E.2d 485, 490 (1971)).
13. 244 Va. 271, 421 S.E.2d 407 (1992).
14. Id. at 274, 421 S.E.2d at 409.
15. Id.
16. 243 Va. 475, 416 S.E.2d 444 (1992).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.74:1 (Repl. Vol. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1993) states in part:
The ... unit owners' association, or the person specified in the bylaws of the associa-
tion shall keep detailed records of the receipts and expenditures affecting the opera-
tion and administration of the condominium and specifying the maintenance and re-
pair expenses of the common elements and any other expenses incurred by or on
1993]
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administration of the condominium""8 and rejected the associa-
tion's additional arguments that an administrative resolution by
the association defined "books and records" to exclude employee
compensation;1 9 and that compensation information falls within
the exception afforded by Code of Virginia section 55-79.75.1 0
D. Easements and Rights-of-Way
The Supreme Court of Virginia took the opportunity afforded by
a case involving an asserted prescriptive easement of ingress and
egress over a railway to reiterate a long-standing rule that pre-
scriptive rights cannot be acquired in property affected with a pub-
lic use. In Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Waselchalk,2' the
claimant moved her mobile home onto a tract separated by a rail-
road track from another portion of her land. The land across the
tracks from the mobile home had access to a public road, whereas
the tract on which the home was previously located did not. The
railroad right-of-way had been conveyed in 1851, at which time the
railroad built (and its successor in title since maintained) a cross-
ing between what was then two portions of a farm. Upon hearing
of the complainant's proposed use of the tract as a residence, the
railroad insisted she sign a residential crossing easement.22 The
claimant refused and asserted a prescriptive right to use the cross-
ing. The Supreme Court of Virginia assumed, without deciding,
behalf of the association. All such records.. . and any other records pertaining to
the condominium, shall be available for examination by all the unit owners.....
The Supreme Court of Virginia applied the principle of statutory construction to this clear
and unambiguous statute in observing that specific amounts of compensation paid to the
association's employees clearly relate to the operation and administration of the condomin-
ium, should be part of the association's records, and are subject to inspection by the owners.
Grillo v. Montebello Condominium Unit Assoc., 243 Va. 475, 477, 416 S.E.2d 444, 445
(1992) (citing Barr v. Town & Country Properties, 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674
(1990) and quoting Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 924, 930, 172 S.E. 445, 447 (1934)).
18. GriUo, 243 Va. at 477, 416 S.E.2d at 445.
19. "It is without question that an administrative resolution adopted by a condominium
unit owners' association cannot defeat a statutory right created by the General Assembly."
Id. at 478, 416 S.E.2d at 445.
20. The court distinguished information which may have been discussed by the unit
owner's board of directors in closed sessions, such as performance evaluations, from salary
information, and found "nothing in Code § [sic] 55-79.75 which bars [the unit owner's] right
to review 'detailed records of receipts and expenditures.'" Id., 416 S.E.2d at 446.
21. 244 Va. 329, 421 S.E.2d 424 (1992).
22. The court noted that although under VA. CODE ANN. § 56-16 (Repl. Vol. 1986 & Cum.
Supp. 1993) the railroad is obliged to pay the maintenance costs of farm crossings, residen-
tial crossings, which are presumably used more frequently, must be maintained at the ex-
pense of the residential user. Waselchalk, 244 Va. at 331, 421 S.E.2d at 425.
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that the claimant had proved all the necessary elements of a pre-
scriptive easement, but held that regardless, the railroad right-of-
way was affected with a public interest 23 and that prescriptive
rights cannot be acquired in land affected with a public interest or
dedicated to a public use.24
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered a different question
in Ryder v. Petrea.25 Ryder owned two adjacent lots in a recorded
subdivision which had always been conveyed as a unit since subdi-
vision. The court permitted Ryder to use rights-of-way established
by the subdivision plat although the lots abutted a public road and
the recorded plat did not comply with the subdivision require-
ments in effect at the time it was recorded, failing to vest any'
rights to the streets and roads therein to the public.2 6 The supreme
court held that Ryder acquired a private right in and to the rights-
of-way shown on the defective plat.27 The court went on to note
that since the two lots had always been conveyed together, "as a
unit," both lots were entitled to such rights-of-way, even though
only one of them actually fronted the rights-of-way. 8
E. Landlord and Tenant
The Supreme Court of Virginia did not sympathize with a ten-
ant who precipitously engaged in self-help to remedy an asserted
breach of a lease, instead of giving the landlord notice of the de-
fault and an opportunity to cure it. In Business Bank v. F.W.
Woolworth Co.,29 the lessee bank occupied a building under a lease
which did not require the lessor to repair or replace a broken air
conditioning system, but which did require the lessor to furnish
heating, ventilation and air conditioning services. The air condi-
tioning system failed and the lessee arranged to have repairs cost-
ing more than $25,000 made without notifying the lessor. The
23. Id. at 331, 421 S.E.2d at 425 (noting that over 3000 railroad cars per day pass over the
tracks).
24. Id. at 331, 421 S.E.2d at 425 (citing Preshlock v. Brenner, 234 Va. 407, 409, 362 S.E.2d
696, 697 (1987) and quoting City of Lynchburg v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry., 170 Va. 108,
116, 195 S.E. 510, 514 (1938)).
25. 243 Va. 421, 416 S.E.2d 686 (1992).
26. Id. at 423, 416 S.E.2d at 688.
27. Id. at 424, 416 S.E.2d at 688, (citing Lindsay v. James, 188 Va. 646, 51 S.E.2d 326
(1949)) (stating that the extent of an easement of this nature would be to those streets and
alleys shown on the plat as are reasonably beneficial to the claimant).
28. Id.
29. 244 Va. 333, 421 S.E.2d 425 (1992).
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court determined that the lessee had an obligation to furnish the
lessor with notice of the asserted default and an opportunity to
cure it before the lessee could remedy the problem.3 0
In Virginia Dynamics Co. v. Payne,3 1 the supreme court ad-
dressed whether a landlord is entitled to split its cause of action
and sue for rent remaining under the unexpired term of a lease
subsequent to an unlawful detainer action. The court reversed a
circuit court holding that the earlier district court decision which
held judgment for unlawful detainer was res judicata. The court
found Code of Virginia section 8.01-128 to control,32 unambigu-
ously giving the lessor an option to defer its claim for rent in an
unlawful detainer case to a future action.3 3 The court, likewise, re-
jected the lessee's assertion that lessor, by including a rent acceler-
ation clause in the lease, contracted away its right to split its
causes of action. The court observed that for the lessee to prevail
in this argument, the lessor must have specifically waived its statu-
tory right under Code of Virginia section 8.01-128, which lessor
had not done. 4
F. Mechanics' Liens
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that a road and ex-
cavation contractor was entitled to perfect a mechanic's lien
against a parcel of land, when its notice of lien described the land,
30. Id. at 335, 421 S.E.2d at 427. The court noted the lessee's reliance on Restatement
(Second) of Property as illustrative of remedies available to the lessee, but pointed to sec-
tion 10.2 of the Restatement, which required prior notice and right to cure, as determinative
and consistent with Virginia law, citing Caudill v. Gibson Fuel Co., 185 Va. 233, 240-41, 38
S.E.2d 465, 469 (1946) and Code of Virginia § 52-248.23 (Repl. Vol. 1991) (governing essen-
tial services to leased residential real estate).
31. 244 Va. 314, 421 S.E.2d 421 (1992).
32. Code of Virginia section 8.01-128 states:
If it appear that the plaintiff was forcibly or unlawfully turned out of possession, or
that it was unlawfully detained from him, the verdict or judgment shall be for the
plaintiff for the premises, or such part thereof as may be found to have been so held
or detained. The verdict or judgment shall also be for such damages as the plaintiff
may prove to have been sustained by him by reason of such forcible or unlawful en-
try, or unlawful detention, of such premises, and such rent as he may prove to have
been owing to him provided such damages rent claimed shall not exceed the jurisdic-
tional amount of the court in which the action is tried. No such verdict or judgment
shall bar any separate concurrent or future action for any such damages or rent as
may not be claimed.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-128 (Repl. Vol. 1992) (emphasis added).
33. Virginia Dynamics, 244 Va. at 317, 421 S.E.2d at 423.
34. Id. at 318, 421 S.E.2d at 423.
[Vol. 27:805
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by metes and bounds, as a 45.6-acre parcel, notwithstanding the
owner's contention that the description was overinclusive and thus,
invalid. In Blue Ridge Construction Corp. v. Stafford Develop-
ment Group,35 the owner asserted that his division of the land into
lots by an unrecorded subdivision plat, invalidated the metes and
bounds description because many of the lots were not served or
benefitted by the lienor's work."6 The Supreme Court of Virginia
disagreed, holding that the unrecorded subdivision plat did not ef-
fect a valid subdivision of the owner's land. The lienor was entitled
to rely on the land records as he found them, which described the
property as a single 45.6-acre parcel. 37
In George W. Kane, Inc. v. Nuscope, Inc.,3 a case of first im-
pression, the Supreme Court of Virginia confronted an interesting
question: whether the owner of real estate encumbered by a sub-
contractor's mechanic's lien and the trustees and noteholder under
a deed of trust filed prior to the mechanic's lien against the real
estate are necessary parties to the subcontractor's lawsuit to en-
force its lien, when the mechanic's lien had been "bonded off" and
released of record pursuant to Code of Virginia section 43.71.11 The
court noted that the statute specifically called for the release of the
lien from the real property upon receipt of permission from the
circuit court to "bond off" and the posting of the payment bond.40
The supreme court reaffirmed its holdings in two cases cited by the
35. 244 Va. 361, 421 S.E.2d 199 (1992).
36. Id. at 363-64, 421 S.E.2d at 200.
37. The court distinguished two cases cited by the owner. In Woodington Elec. v. Lincoln
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Va. 623, 385 S.E.2d 872 (1989), the court had ruled that a
mechanic's lien could not be enforced where the lienor sought to include in its notice parcels
on which it had not performed work. In Rosser v. Cole, 237 Va. 572, 379 S.E.2d 323 (1989),
the court invalidated liens against lots in a recorded subdivision where the lienor had only
worked on the streets and roads, but not the lots. Here the court found that there was only
one parcel, and work performed on any part thereof entitled the contractor to lien the entire
parcel.
38. 243 Va. 503, 416 S.E.2d 701 (1992).
39. Id. at 504, 416 S.E.2d at 702.
40. Code of Virginia section 43-71 provides:
At any time after the perfecting of any such [mechanic's] lien and before a suit be
brought for the enforcement thereof, the owner of the property affected thereby, the
general contractor or other parties in interest may... apply to the court... for
permission ... to file such bond, as prescribed in [§ 43-70].... Upon the granting
of such permission, and ... the filing of such bond ... the property affected thereby
shall stand released from such lien.... The sureties on any such bond, which may
be involved in any suit or action brought under the provisions of this section, shall be
made party to such suit or action.
VA. CODE ANN. § 43-71 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
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landowner,4' but distinguished the instant case by noting that the
bond had been posted prior to bringing the lawsuit to enforce the
lien and holding that when the owner posted the bond, "[t]he
mechanic's lien would cease to exist, leaving the bond as the
mechanic's sole recourse."42 The court cited language from earlier
decisions:
Where an individual is in the actual enjoyment of the subject mat-
ter, or has an interest in it, either in possession or expectancy, which
is likely either to be defeated or diminished by the plaintiff's claim,
in such case he has an immediate interest in resisting the demand,
and all persons who have such immediate interests are necessary
parties to the suit.43
The court concluded that once the mechanic's lien had been re-
moved from the land and attached to the payment bond, the land-
owner and the trustees and noteholder had no interest in the bond
per se and were no longer necessary parties to the subcontractor's
suit to enforce its lien.44
In an analogous case, Air Power, Inc. v. Thompson,4 5 a subcon-
tractor sought to enforce its lien against property constituting the
res of a land trust.4 The issue was whether the beneficiaries of the
land trust were necessary parties. The Supreme Court of Virginia
held they were not, noting that land trust beneficiaries do not hold
interests in real estate, but in personal property.47
41. Mendenhall v. Cooper, 239 Va. 71, 387 S.E.2d 468 (1990) (extending the Robbins rule
to include the owner of the land); Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43, 348
S.E.2d 223 (1986) (holding that the beneficiary and the trustees of a deed of trust recorded
against land prior to the commencement of construction of improvements are necessary par-
ties to a lawsuit brought to enforce a mechanic's lien because the beneficiary has a property
right entitling him to notice and the trustee has title to the property which could not be
divested if he were not before the court).
42. Kane, 243 Va. at 509, 416 S.E.2d at 704.
43. Mendenhall, 239 Va. at 75, 387 S.E.2d at 470; Raney v. Four Thirty Seven Land Co.,
223 Va. 513, 519-20, 357 S.E.2d 733, 736 (1987); Gaddess v. Norris, 102 Va. 625, 630, 46 S.E.
905, 907 (1904).
44. Kane, 243 Va. at 509-10, 416 S.E.2d at 705.
45. 244 Va. 534, 422 S.E.2d 768 (1992).
46. Id. at 535, 422 S.E.2d at 769.
47. Id. at 537, 422 S.E.2d at 770.
812 [Vol. 27:805
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G. Leases
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the ambiguity of ter-
mination language in a lease and the unconscionability of a release
of the lease rights by a lessee in Management Enterprises, Inc. v.
The Thorncroft Co., Inc.4" Thorncroft, the lessor, entered into a
hunting lease (or license agreement) with Management Enter-
prises, the lessee, giving Management Enterprises the right to
hunt, fish and trap 619 acres of Thorncroft's property in Northum-
berland County for a thirty-two-year term ending in 2013, for a
rent of $49,520 payable in annual installments of $1,547.50.4'
Thorncroft subsequently contracted to sell part of the property
subject to the lease to a third-party purchaser. The purchaser ex-
amined the title and discovered the recorded lease. The lease con-
stituted a cloud on title to the property.50 After negotiations with
lessee, Thorncroft secured a release of the lease from Management
in consideration for a payment of $15,000.1
Three years later, Thorncroft filed a petition seeking rescission
of the lease alleging the following: unconscionability and breach of
the lease by Management; an adjudication that the lease provided
for a three-month notice of termination; an adjudication that the
release was void and unenforceable because of fraud, misrepresen-
tation and duress; refund of the $15,000 release fee; and other re-
lief.52 The chancellor found that the lease could be terminated at
any time upon three months notice and that Management must
return the $15,000 release fee as unconscionable.5
The Supreme Court of Virginia applied the "plain meaning" rule
to paragraph two of the lease. 4 The court held that the language
plainly and unequivocally required the lessor to give written notice
three months before the termination date, February 28, 2013, and
required the lessor to give like notice three months before the de-
sired termination date.5 Thus, no right to terminate the lease ex-
48. 243 Va. 469, 416 S.E.2d 229 (1992).
49. Id. at 470-71, 416 S.E.2d at 230.
50. Id. at 471, 416 S.E.2d at 230.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 472, 416 S.E.2d at 231. The plain meaning rule is articulated in Berry v.
Klinger, 225 Va. 201, 208, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983) (quoting Globe Co. v. Bank of Boston,
205 Va. 841, 848, 140 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1965)).
55. 243 Va. at 472, 416 S.E.2d at 231.
8131993]
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isted prior to the termination date. 6 The court then dismissed les-
sor's claim that the $15,000 payment was unconscionable by
applying the rule that an inequality, if any, must be so gross as to
shock the conscience.5 Having concluded that the lessor could not
have terminated the lease before the year 2013, it was not surpris-
ing for the supreme court to conclude that the lessee had a sub-
stantial interest in the property and that $15,000 to release that
interest was not so gross an amount as to shock the conscience.5 8
H. Restrictive Covenants
Foods First, Inc. v. Gables Associates,59 gave the Supreme Court
of Virginia the opportunity to confirm previously enunciated law
relative to enforcing restrictive covenants. Foods First operated a
15,000-square-foot supermarket under a lease from Gables Associ-
ates, the center's developer. The lease contained a restrictive cove-
nant prohibiting the developer from erecting another building
designed for a supermarket or food store:
It is further agreed that in the event of such development [expan-
sion of the center to a certain size, a development which had oc-
curred] Lessor will not erect such other building to be occupied by
super market, grocery store, meat market or produce store in excess
of the number of square feet in the building occupied by [lessee]."0
56. Paragraph two of the lease states:
A WRITTEN NOTICE OF THREE MONTHS shall be given by the Lessee should
he desire to vacate at the termination of the lease; and should the lessor desire pos-
session a like notice shall be required; in the event no such notice is given by either
party, then the lease shall continue in force from year to year at the same rent and
subject to all the conditions and covenants herein contained. But, if such notice shall
have been given by either party, the Lessor, his agents or assigns, may advertise the
premises for rent in one or more conspicuous places and may show the premises to
any person desiring to rent the same for the purposes of game management.
Id. at 471, 416 S.E.2d at 231. The court apparently concluded that the phrase "a like notice"
was not ambiguous, and meant not only that it be written, but also that it be given only at
the termination date of the lease.
57. Id. at 473, 416 S.E.2d at 231-32 (quoting Smyth Bros. v. Beresford, 128 Va. 137, 140,
104 S.E. 371, 382 (1920)).
58. Id., 416 S.E.2d at 232.
59. 244 Va. 180, 418 S.E.2d 888 (1992).
60. Id., 418 S.E.2d at 889.
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The lessor contracted to renovate a former department store build-
ing in the center, containing 29,500 square feet, to be used by a
third party as a grocery store.6 1
Foods First filed a bill of complaint seeking an injunction and
damages against the lessor and the third party, claiming that the
plain meaning of the restriction was to prevent a grocery store
larger than Foods First from occupying any building in the center
and that "erect" should be read to include remodeling an existing
building for another use.2
The supreme court conducted a two-step analysis. First, it noted
that restrictive covenants are not favored at law and will be con-
strued against the party seeking enforcement63 and that the party
seeking enforcement has the burden of proving the covenant's ap-
plicability to the act about which the party is complaining. 64 Sec-
ondly, citing a line of cases,65 the Supreme Court of Virginia ob-
served that where the terms of a written document are clear, the
court must construe them as written and the language used by the
parties will be interpreted according to its plain meaning.6 6 In the
instant case, occupancy of a store larger than Foods First was pro-
hibited only where Gables erected a building for such use contain-
ing more square feet than the Foods First building.67 In interpret-
ing the meaning of the word "erect," the supreme court pointed to
an earlier decision in which "erect" was held to mean "to build."6 "
The court held that interior remodeling of an existing building was
not equivalent to building or erecting a building and, hence, not
prohibited by the restrictive covenant.6 9
61. Id.
62. Id. at 182, 418 S.E.2d at 889.
63. Id. (citing Hening v. Maynard, 227 Va. 113, 117, 313 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1984)).
64. Id. (citing Mid-States Equip. Co. v. Bell, 217 Va. 133, 140, 225 S.E.2d 877, 884
(1976)).
65. Greater Richmond Civic Recreation, Inc. v. A.H. Ewing's Sons, Inc., 200 Va. 593, 596,
106 S.E.2d 595, 597 (1959); Krikorian v. Dailey, 171 Va. 16, 24, 197 S.E. 442, 446 (1938).
66. 244 Va. at 182, 418 S.E.2d at 889-90 (citing Amos v. Coffey, 228 Va. 88, 92, 320 S.E.2d
335, 337 (1984) and Berry v. Klinger, 225 Va. 201, 208, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983)).
67. Id. at 183, 418 S.E.2d at 890.
68. Id. at 183, 418 S.E.2d at 890 (citing Carroll v. City of Lynchburg, 84 Va. 803, 804, 6
S.E. 133, 134 (1888)).
69. Id. at 183, 418 S.E.2d at 890.
1993]
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I. Specific Performance
In a case with complex facts, Yamada v. McLeod,70 the Supreme
Court of Virginia considered a case involving dower, marketable
title and the remedy of specific performance. The Yamadas had
contracted to purchase an expensive residence from McLeod and
others, the sellers. The sellers obtained the title from three daugh-
ters of the decedent who held record title.71 The daughters exe-
cuted the deed of conveyance to the sellers solely in their capacity
as executors of the decedent.7 2 The daughters had qualified as ex-
ecutors under a duly probated will which specifically granted the
executors full power to sell real property of the decedent's estate.
I grant unto my Executor ... the full power and authority to sell
... any real property which I may own at the time of my death, at
such price and upon such terms and conditions as my Executor in
his sole discretion may determine; and to the end, my Executor may
execute, acknowledge and deliver any and all necessary or appropri-
ate ... deeds ... for the effective ... conveyance thereof, and no
purchaser ... shall be required to see to the proper application of
any funds, property, money or proceeds thereto.73
Purchasers' title attorney advised them that the sellers had defec-
tive title because the executors had only deeded the property to
the sellers in their capacity as executors and had failed to execute
the deed in their capacity as beneficiaries, along with their respec-
tive spouses who needed to convey their inchoate curtesy inter-
ests.7 4 This "defect" was reported to the sellers, whose attorney
and title insurance company advised the purchasers' attorney that
his assertion was incorrect.7 15 The sellers advised the purchasers
that they would attempt to enforce the contract.76 The purchasers,
meanwhile, contracted to purchase another residence. 7
The sellers brought a multi-count suit against the purchasers in
which they alleged the title to be marketable and asked the court
70. 243 Va. 426, 416 S.E.2d 222 (1992).
71. Id. at 428, 416 S.E.2d at 223.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 429, 416 S.E.2d at 224.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 430, 416 S.E.2d at 224.
77. Id.
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to compel the purchasers by means of specific performance to close
on the property under the contract.
The Supreme Court of Virginia first addressed the title issue,
holding that the executors possessed a "naked" power of sale
under the will. 78 Upon the executors exercising this power, title to
the land is "divested" from the devisees 9 The court reasoned that
if the devisees were divested of whatever rights they had in the
property, there was no interest to which their husbands' derivative
curtesy rights could have attached.80 It follows that the deed from
the executors divested the daughters and their husbands, of any
interest in the property and conveyed good and marketable title to
the sellers.
The supreme court then held that the purchasers' attorney's
contrary opinion as to title did not justify the purchasers' failure to
close.8 1 The purchasers' attorney's knowledge that other attorneys
and the sellers' title company disagreed with his opinion was im-
puted to the purchasers.82 The court closed by discussing whether
the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the sellers specific
performance and, after citing relevant Virginia authority, 3 found
that under the circumstances of the case, the trial court had not.
78. Id. at 431, 416 S.E.2d at 225 (citing Stark v. City of Norfolk, 183 Va. 282, 288, 32
S.E.2d 59, 61 (1944)).
79. Id. (citing Coles v. Jamerson, 112 Va. 311, 316, 71 S.E. 618, 619-20 (1911)).
80. Id. (citing George L. Haskins, The Defeasibility of Dower, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 826, 833
(1950)). Compare L. C. Warden, Annotation, Dower or Curtesy in Estate of Inheritance
Subject to Condition, Defeasance, Termination, or Expiration, 25 A.L.R.2d 333, 336, 351-
52 (1952) (stating that no dower or curtesy in spouse's fee simple defeasible estate subject to
condition subsequent when terminating condition occurred during spouse's lifetime) with
Snidow v. Snidow, 192 Va. 60, 64-65, 63 S.E.2d 620, 623 (1951) (applying the contrary rule
when terminating condition occurred upon spouse's death). Note that dower and curtesy
have been abolished as to those interests not vested prior to January 1, 1991. VA. CoD ANN.
§ 64.1-19.2 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
81. Id. at 432, 416 S.E.2d at 225 (citing Lyle v. Andrews, 217 Va. 192, 194, 227 S.E.2d 686,
688 (1976)).
82. Id. at 433, 416 S.E.2d at 226 (citing Allen Realty Corp. v. Holbert, 227 Va. 441, 446,
318 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1984) (stating that knowledge of agent is generally imputed to princi-
pal) and Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste M. R.R. v. Saint Paul Mercury-Indem. Co., 268 Minn.
390, 405, 129 N.W.2d 777, 787 (1964) (stating that knowledge of attorney is imputed to
client)).
83. Id. at 432-33, 416 S.E.2d at 226 (citing Allen v. Lindstrom, 237 Va. 489, 497, 379
S.E.2d 450, 455 (1989); Dunsmore v. Lyle, 87 Va. 391, 392-93, 12 S.E. 610, 611 (1891); Ayers
v. Robins, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 105, 115-16 (1878)).
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J. Zoning and Land Use
The Supreme Court of Virginia underscored the proposition that
a governing body may not apply unwritten "practice" concerning
informally filed grandfather applications under a prior zoning law
to a newer law by the standards of the older law, unless the newer
law specifically countenanced the same. In Parker v. County of
Madison,84 a developer purchased seventy-nine acres in Madison
County and thereafter filed a preliminary plat with the county ad-
ministrator, applying to subdivide the land into eleven residential
lots. The Parkers owned a contiguous farm. 5 Both tracts were
zoned for agricultural use. Subsequently, Madison County's Board
of Supervisors amended the zoning ordinance, prohibiting the sub-
division of agricultural parcels into more than four lots in any
four-year period.86
The developer reduced the number of lots from eleven to eight
and a public hearing was held by the county planning commission
on the developer's proposal. The Parkers objected to the proposed
subdivision at the hearing. Some months later, the developer sub-
mitted a final plat for eight lots, with some revisions from the pre-
vious submission. The planning commission recommended ap-
proval and the board of supervisors approved the plat.87 The
Parkers brought a declaratory judgment action against the devel-
oper and the county to void the approval. The chancellor ruled in
favor of the county and developer, finding that the county acted
consistently with a long-standing practice that applicants were en-
titled to rely upon the ordinance in effect when the subdivision
plat was first submitted."'
The supreme court reversed. It interpreted Code of Virginia sec-
tion 1-16 to mean that proceedings under an amendment to a for-
mer law "shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force
at the time of such proceedings."89 The court further noted that
this rule applies to amendments of local ordinances.9 0 If the
Madison County ordinance, as opposed to unwritten custom, had
84. 244 Va. 39, 418 S.E.2d 855 (1992).
85. Id. at 40, 418 S.E.2d at 855.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 41, 418 S.E.2d at 856.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Chesterfield Civic Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 215 Va. 399, 402, 209 S.E.2d 925,
927 (1974).
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countenanced permitting the developer to rely upon the prior ordi-
nance, notwithstanding the amendment to that ordinance, the
court indicated that it would have sustained the finding.91 How-
ever, the ordinance did not permit such reliance.
In Dick Kelly Enterprises, Virginia Partnership, #11 v. City of
Norfolk,92 the Supreme Court of Virginia confronted a bitter ap-
pellant whose apartment project had been closed by the city. In
1983, Kelly applied for and received a certificate of occupancy
from the City of Norfolk for a three-story, forty-two-unit motel in
the Ocean View section of the city. However, instead of operating
the building as a motel, Kelly operated it as an apartment build-
ing. In August 1990, the city notified the partnership of alleged
zoning and building code violations at the property. Kelly neither
complied with the directives contained in the notice, nor appealed
to the Norfolk Board of Zoning Appeals.9"
The city brought suit seeking a permanent injunction to prohibit
Kelly from using the property as an apartment complex and from
occupying the premises in any fashion until the appropriate certifi-
cate of occupancy for an authorized use had been issued. Notwith-
standing Kelly's demurrer and other asserted defenses, the trial
court granted the city its requested relief.
The court first noted that Kelly's failure to "[p]ursue an availa-
ble administrative remedy, an appeal to the Board of Zoning Ap-
peals from the zoning administrator's decision, pervades the entire'
case. '9 4 The court also noted the well-settled principle that "ex-
haustion of administrative remedies where zoning ordinances are
involved is essential before a judicial attack may be mounted
against the interpretation of such ordinances."" The court went on
to reject each of Kelly's arguments: the city was estopped by its
prior consent to Kelly's use of the facilities as an apartment,96
91. Parker, 244 Va. at 43, 418 S.E.2d at 857.
92. 243 Va. 373, 416 S.E.2d 680 (1992).
93. Id. at 376, 416 S.E.2d at 682.
94. Id. at 377, 416 S.E.2d at 683 (noting that the Board of Zoning Appeals is empowered:
"[tlo hear and decide appeals from the decision of the zoning administrator" (citing VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.1-495 37 (Cum. Supp. 1993))). The court also refers to Code of Virginia
section 15.1-496(1) which states that an appeal should be taken within thirty days after
decision appealed from.
95. Dick Kelly, 243 Va. at 378, 416 S.E.2d at 683.
96. "Estoppel does not apply to the government in the discharge of governmental func-
tions." Gvinn v. Alward, 235 Va. 616, 621, 369 S.E.2d 410, 413 (1988).
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Kelly's equitable defense in the nature of "dirty hands, '97 and the
city's failure to enforce the ordinance consistently in the past had
waived the city's right to do so against Kelly. 8 Finally, the court
found that Kelly's assertion of "retaliatory prosecution"99 failed
because Kelly's use of the property was unlawful.1 e0
In Cook v. Board of Zoning Appeals,101 the Supreme Court of
Virginia reversed a finding that a property purchased by a church
had been constructed prior to .1910 and, under the applicable sec-
tion of the zoning ordinance,0 2 was deemed to be of historical sig-
nificance and therefore could not be demolished unless the archi-
tectural review board approved the demolition permit. The court
concluded that the plain language of the statute required desig-
nated structures to be listed in the Official Register of Protected
Structures and Sites, with the designation then being recorded in
the land records.103 Therefore, deeming the residence historic was
not enough; the structure needed to be listed in the register and
recorded in the land records.104
In Board of Supervisors v. Gaffney, °5 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia had to interpret whether operating a nudist club was permit-
ted by the applicable zoning classification.10 6 A special use permit
had originally been issued to the club owners, which would have
mooted the question of compliance with the zoning classification,
but the board of supervisors revoked the permit on the grounds
that the owner had not disclosed the nudist activities in his permit
application.1 0 7 Various neighbors complained that the nudists' Va-
97. Kelly asserted that the city had encouraged Kelly to misstate its proposed use of the
premises when first applying for the permit as part of a city scheme to relocate low-rent
housing into this section of Ocean View. Dick Kelly, 243 Va. at 380, 416 S.E.2d at 684.
98. Id. at 382, 416 S.E.2d at 680 (citing Commonwealth v. Washington Gas Light Co., 221
Va. 315, 323, 269 S.E.2d 820, 825 (1980)). The court noted that the zoning ordinance and
building code had been legislatively enacted and, therefore, unless authority to waive en-
forcement thereof had also been legislatively enacted, which it had not in this instance, the
city was powerless to waive compliance. Id.
99. Kelly asserted that the city was making an example of Kelly for challenging high tax
assessments. Id. at 380, 416 S.E.2d at 684.
100. Id. at 383, 416 S.E.2d at 686.
101. 244 Va. 107, 418 S.E.2d 879 (1992).
102. FALLs CHURCH VA. CODE § 38-39(e) (Supp. No. 2 1988) (creating historic and cultural
conservation districts).
103. See id. § 38-39(d).
104. Cook, 244 Va. at 111, 418 S.E.2d at 881.
105. 244 Va. 545, 422 S.E.2d 760 (1992).
106. Id. at 546, 422 S.E.2d at 761.
107. Id. at 547, 422 S.E.2d at 761.
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rious sports activities were clearly visible from nearby properties
and a nearby public road.
Seeking to determine the naked truth, the supreme court re-
solved the appeal in favor of the county, determining that operat-
ing a nudist club was not specifically listed as a permitted activity
in the county's C-1 Conservation classification."' e Any use not so
listed or permitted by special use permit was not permitted by this
"inclusive" ordinance. 109 The court then noted that the property
owner has the burden to prove that its use of the land is permitted
under the ordinance. The club failed to meet this burden. 110 In a
compelling concurring opinion, Justice Keenan scolded the major-
ity for focusing on the description "nudist club" and argued per-
suasively that "under the majority's view, a governmental entity
can secure the exclusion of any land use simply by assigning it a
label not found in the [inclusive] ordinance.""'
II. LEGISLATION
Within the past year the Virginia General Assembly enacted,
and Governor Wilder signed into law, a number of bills relating to
the ownership and operation of real property in Virginia. A brief
summary of some of the more important pieces of legislation
follows.
A. Aliens as Property Owners
Code of Virginia section 55-1 previously permitted aliens to ac-
quire, own and sell real estate by purchase or descent. 1 2 The sec-
tion was amended to permit a Virginia court which finds that an
alien's jurisdiction of residence denies Virginia residents the bene-
fit, use or control of money or property, to direct that the alien's
money or property in Virginia be paid into court for the benefit of
the alien."' The money or property may be paid out only upon the
108. Id. at 550, 422 S.E.2d at 762-63.
109. Id., 422 S.E.2d at 763 (emphasis in original). The court differentiated "inclusive"
zoning ordinances, those which specify only those uses which are permitted, with all other
uses being prohibited, from "exclusive" ordinances which permit all uses except those spe-
cifically prohibited. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 553, 422 S.E.2d at 765.
112. Act of Mar. 24, 1993, ch. 535, 1993 Va. Acts 659 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-1
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
113. Id.
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order of the impounding court or other court of competent juris-
diction and if money or property remains in court after three years
have elapsed, the court may then distribute it as if the alien had
predeceased the decedent." 4
B. Clerk's Fees
Code of Virginia section 55-66.61"1 was altered to clarify that the
fee charged by the clerk for recording a certificate of satisfaction is
payable by the lien debtor.
C. Comprehensive Plans
The definitional sections of two code sections dealing with his-
toric areas were slightly altered. Code of Virginia section 15.1-
430(b)" 6 now makes it clear that historic areas can include as few
as one building and also adds "archaeological" to those notable
features relating to the cultural or historic heritage of the commu-
nity such as to warrant preservation. "Archaeological" was also
added to the list of notable characteristics under Code of Virginia
section 15.1-503.2,'" entitling buildings or structures to be desig-
nated "historic" by the Virginia Board of Historic Resources.
The statute creating agricultural and forestal districts" 8 was
amended to require the local governing body to designate agricul-
tural and forestal districts on the comprehensive plan map each
time the comprehensive plan is updated.1 9
D. Condominium Act
The large number of amended statutes relating to condominiums
and their operation attests to the growing importance of this form
of real property ownership in the Commonwealth. A few of the
more wide-reaching changes are noted in this section.
114. Id.
115. Act of Mar. 3, 1993, ch. 39, 1993 Va. Acts 38 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-66.6
(Cure. Supp. 1993)).
116. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 770, 1993 Va. Acts 1096 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-
430(b) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
117. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-503.2 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
118. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 745, 1993 Va. Acts 1056 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-
1511(D) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
119. Id.
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Code of Virginia section 55-79.9912° was amended to require the
Real Estate Board to enforce the Condominium Act, removing the
board's discretionary authority. Convertible lands can now be con-
verted to condominium use for up to seven years instead of five
years.12' The definitions under Code of Virginia section 55-79.41122
were amended to include within the definition of "declarant" insti-
tutional lenders "which may not have succeeded to or accepted any
special declarant rights"'23 pursuant to Code of Virginia section
55-79.74:3. An individual who acquires title to a condominium unit
at a foreclosure sale was excluded from the definition of
"declarant.'1 24
Unit owners' associations were specifically given the right to sue
in their own name for claims relating to the common elements as
provided for in Code of Virginia section 55-79.80(B)."2 5 Code of
Virginia section 55-79.53(B) now enables condominium documents
to provide for arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution. 2
The legislature amended Code of Virginia section 55-79.73,127 pro-
viding that a majority of the remaining board members may fill a
vacancy on the board of a unit owners' association, unless the con-
dominium documents provide otherwise.
Further strengthening the hand of the unit owners' associations,
a new subsection was added to Code of Virginia section 55-79.80128
permitting an association to withhold non-essential services and
the right to use common elements from a unit owner who is delin-
quent in paying his assessment, provided, however, that the associ-
ation cannot deny access to the unit through the common ele-
ments. The association may also assess charges for violating the
rules and regulations of the condominium instruments by the
owner, his family members, tenants, guests and invitees. 129
120. Act of Mar. 15, 1993, ch. 198, 1993 Va. Acts 225 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
79.99(A) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
121. Act of Mar. 3, 1993, ch. 45, 1993 Va. Acts 42 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.61
(Cune. Supp. 1993)).
122. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 667, 1993 Va. Acts 931 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
79.41 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 667, 1993 Va. Acts 931 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §55-
79.53(a) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
126. Id. (codified at' VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.53(B) (Cum. Supp 1993)).
127. Id.
128. Id. (codified at VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-79.80:2 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
129. Id.
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A new provision was added to Code of Virginia section 55-79.73
stating that if a mortgagee's consent is required for the amend-
ment of the condominium's bylaws, such consent shall be deemed
given if the association mails the text of the proposed amendment
to the mortgagee in the prescribed fashion and receives no objec-
tion within ninety days following receipt by the mortgagee.130
E. Deeds of Trust and Trustees' Sales
A new subsection was added to Code of Virginia section 55-
59.1131 providing that if the beneficiary of a deed of trust which is
being foreclosed has lost the note, the beneficiary can nevertheless
proceed with the sale and protect the trustee and the validity of
the sale by sending written notice of the pending sale and the loss
of the note to the maker of the note. The maker then has the op-
tion of requesting the beneficiary to obtain court permission to
conduct the sale. The court may require the beneficiary to provide
for adequate protection of the maker of the note against claims
from a third person to enforce the note as a precondition to giving
its permission to conduct the sale. Once the trustee proceeds to
sale, the lost instrument shall not affect the trustee's authority or
the validity of the sale."3 2
The legislature also amended two code sections dealing with sub-
stituted trustees. Code of Virginia section 26-49,133 governing ap-
pointment of trustees, was amended to provide a "carve out" ex-
ception to section 55-59. Section 55-59 itself1 3 4 was amended to
prescribe the mechanics whereby substitute trustees can be ap-
pointed, regardless if such power is embodied in the deed of
trust.13 5
130. Act of Feb. 9, 1993, ch. 1, 1993 Va. Acts 1 (codified at VA CODE ANN. § 55-79.73:1
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
131. Act of Mar. 26, 1993, ch. 597, 1993 Va. Acts 751 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
59.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
132. Id.
133. Act of Mar. 22, 1993, ch. 426, 1993 Va. Acts 498 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-49
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
134. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59 (Repl. Vol. 1986)).
135. The added provision calls for the entitled beneficiary to execute and acknowledge an
instrument appointing the new trustee and recording it in the clerk's office where the deed
of trust was recorded, whereupon the substitute trustee therein named will be vested with
all the rights, powers, authority and duties vested in the original trustee under the deed of
trust. Id.
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F. Judgments and Liens
To clarify that the beneficiary of a land trust holds an interest
other than real estate, the General Assembly amended Code of
Virginia section 55-17.1.136 The section now specifies that neither
judgments against a beneficiary of a land trust nor consensual liens
against such beneficiary's real estate attach to the real estate sub-
jected to a land trust unless the judgment is docketed or the lien is
recorded before the deed creating the land trust is recorded and
while the beneficiary retains record title to the real estate.13 7
An amendment to Code of Virginia section 58.1-1805131 prohibits
the Department of Taxation from filing a tax lien memorandum
without giving the taxpayer ten days' notice, except in those situa-
tions where the Commissioner determines that prior notice will
jeopardize the collection efforts, in which event concurrent notice
is permitted. 3
G. Leases, Rents or Profits
Code of Virginia section 55-220.114° was amended to clarify that
the recording in the proper clerk's office of a deed, deed of trust or
other instrument assigning the interest of the grantor, assignor or
transferror shall fully protect the interest of the grantees, assignees
or transferrees, without the necessity of other actions being under-
taken, such as furnishing notice, taking possession, or impounding
the rents.'
H. Property Owners' Association Act
Various statutes outlining the rights and duties of Property
Owners' Associations were amended or supplemented to address
discrete issues. A new section was added to Code of Virginia sec-
136. Act of Mar. 2, 1993, ch. 454, 1993 Va. Acts 537 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-17.1
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
137. Id. See also Air Power, Inc. v. Thompson, 244 Va. 534, 422 S.E.2d 768 (1992).
138. Act of Mar. 19, 1993, ch. 384, 1993 Va. Acts 437 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-
1805 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
139. Id. Notice must be sent to the last known address of the taxpayer, i.e., the address
shown on the last-filed tax return or any later correspondence indicating an address change.
140. Act of Mar. 22, 1993, ch. 427, 1993 Va. Acts 500 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
220.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
141. Id. This amendment is effective as to all instruments of record before, on or after
July 1, 1992. Id.
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tion 55-509,111 requiring the developer to pay all real estate taxes
on open or common area through the date of transfer to the associ-
ation. A related code section14 prohibits localities from assessing
real estate taxes against an association for open or common space
except as provided by the section, obligates the locality to reassess
such property concurrent with its transfer to the association, and
mandates the developer to pay all real estate taxes attributable to
such open or common spaces at the time of transfer as provided in
Code of Virginia section 55-509.1.144 Further, associations were
given the power to deny a member delinquent in assessment pay-
ments for non-essential services or facilities, provided that access
to the member's unit through the common areas is not pre-
cluded.145 A new subsection was added to Code of Virginia section
55-515 permitting arbitration or other alternative dispute
resolution. 146
Property owners' associations were instructed to keep their fi-
nancial books and records in accordance with generally accepted
accounting practices. 147 Code of Virginia section 55.510(B)1 48 now
claries that salary information for employees of the association
may be examined and copied by any member in good standing. A
new provision was added to Code of Virginia section 55-51214 re-
quiring that associations disclose any restrictions, limitations or
prohibition on the right of a lot owner to place for sale signs on his
lot.
142. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 956, 1993 Va. Acts 1546 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
509.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
143. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3284.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-509.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
145. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 956, 1993 Va. Acts 1546 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
509.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1993)). See also Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 667, 1993 Va. Acts 667
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.80 (Cum. Supp. 1993)) (providing a similar right to con-
dominium associations).
146. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 956, 1993 Va. Acts 1546 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
515(B) (Cum. Supp. 1993)). See also Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 1198, 1993 Va. Acts 667
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.53(B) (Cum. Supp. 1993)) (providing similar instruction
to condominium associations).
147. Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 827, 1993 Va. Acts 1198 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
510(A) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
148. Act of Mar. 19, 1993, ch. 365, 1993 Va. Acts 318 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55.510(B) (Cum. Supp. 1993)). See also Grillo v. Montebello Condominium Unit Owner's
Ass'n, 243 Va. 475, 416 S.E.2d 444 (1992) (holding that a unit owner was entitled to access
to salary information under a similar statute relating to condominium owners' associations,
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.74:1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
149. Act of Mar. 10, 1993, ch. 96, 1993 Va. Acts 94 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
512(10) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
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I. Residential Property Disclosure Act
On the eve of these statutes' effect, the General Assembly clari-
fied and amended some of their provisions. An important change
was made to Code of Virginia section 55-518.150 The addition elimi-
nates an exemption from disclosure by a builder for the initial sale
of a new residence. Now, the builder is required to disclose in writ-
ing all known material defects which would constitute a violation
of local building codes and, at the builder's election, on the form
prescribed by Code of Virginia section 55-518.151 The builder can-
not satisfy this requirement by resorting to the disclaimer form de-
scribed in Code of Virginia section 55-519.152 Such disclosure does
not void any warranty or other contractual obligation which the
builder may otherwise have with the purchaser.
A statute of limitation provision was added to Code of Virginia
section 55-524,151 providing that single actions brought for both
failure to deliver a disclosure statement and for misrepresenting
information must be brought within one year of the date the pur-
chaser received the disclosure statement. If a statement was not
received, the action must be brought within one year of the date, of
settlement if by naked sale, or date of occupancy if by lease with
an option to purchase.1 54
Code of Virginia section 55-525155 directed the Virginia Real Es-
tate Board to promulgate a disclosure form by January 1, 1993.1-5
The amendment to this section empowers the board, by regulation,
to amend the forms at any time the Board deems necessary or
appropriate.1 5 7
150. Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 824, 1993 Va. Acts 1195 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
518(B) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
151. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-518 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
152. VA. CODE: ANN. § 55-519 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
153. Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 847, 1993 Va. Acts 1223 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
524(C) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
154. Id.
155. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-525 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
156. The board did so. See forms promulgated by the Virginia Beach Real Estate Board,
January 29, 1993, (on file at the University of Richmond Law Review Office).
157. Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 848, 1993 Va. Acts 1233 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-525
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
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J. Taxation
Two code sections were amended by the General Assembly to
provide further tax relief to elderly and handicapped persons.
Code of Virginia section 58.1-3210 now specifically includes manu-
factured homes and also provides that a dwelling jointly held by a
married couple may qualify if either owner is at least sixty-five
years old or is permanently and totally disabled.158
Code of Virginia section 58.1-3211 was amended to eliminate in-
come limits for relatives who live with an elderly or disabled inca-
pacitated person for purposes of being qualified for tax relief.
However, the elderly or disabled owner must not have transferred
certain amounts of assets concurrently with the relative moving in,
or during a three-year period prior to such move-in.15
K. Title Insurance
Two important pieces of legislation governing title insurance in
the Commonwealth were enacted by the General Assembly: Code
of Virginia section 382-4601.1160 and House Bill 2147.161 House Bill
2147 was only provisionally enacted and, to be effective, must be
re-enacted by the 1994 General Assembly. 62 Code of Virginia sec-
tion 38.2-4601.1 amended two code sections: Code of Virginia sec-
tion 38.2-4601 was amended by adding a new sub-section 38.2-
4601.1,163 which defines title insurance agencies or agents as indi-
viduals, corporations, partnerships or other legal entities licensed
in the Commonwealth as a title insurance agent and appointed by
a title insurance company licensed in the Commonwealth to do the
following: evaluate title searches to ascertain insurability, deter-
mine whether underwriting risks have been removed, issue title in-
surance commitments, binders and endorsements, and policies and
endorsements on behalf of the licensed title insurance company. 64
158. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 911, 1993 Va. Acts 1379 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-
3210 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
159. Act of Mar. 11, 1993, ch. 149, 1993 Va. Acts 155 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-
3211 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
160. Act of Mar. 11, 1993, ch. 147, 1993 Va. Acts 152 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-
4601.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
161. H.B. 2147 Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1993).
162. Id.
163. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4601.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
164. Id.
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Code of Virginia section 38.2-4614165 was amended to clarify that
federally insured lenders, their holding companies and their sub-
sidiaries were to be eligible to be so licensed and were permitted to
receive commission from title insurance policies sales in their ca-
pacity as title insurance agencies.
If House Bill 2147166 is reenacted, the amendment will define ti-
tle insurance rates and mandate filing rates with the Virginia In-
surance Commission, prohibit agents or agencies from charging
rates different from those rates so filed and, finally, adding Code of
Virginia section 38.2-4618, would empower the Commission, on its
own or upon complaint by third parties, to investigate compliance
with the rate structure."6 7
L. Transfers for Religious Purposes
The General Assembly restated Code of Virginia section 57-7168
by adding new section 57-7.1169 which provides: any inter vivos
transfer or transfer by will made to or for the benefit of any
church, diocese, religious congregation or religious society, by
purchase or gift shall be valid, subject to the provisions of Code of
Virginia section 57-12;170 any such transfer or conveyance which
fails to state a specific purpose shall be used by the recipient for its
religious and benevolent purposes, as determined by the governing
body of the church or institution having control of temporal mat-
ters; and no such transfer or conveyance shall fail or be voided
where the beneficiary already has lawful trustees in place, is capa-
ble of putting them in place upon application as prescribed by
statute,17 1 or has ecclesiastical officers as statutorily provided and
defined. 72
165. Act of Mar. 11, 1993, ch. 147, 1993 Va. Acts 271 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.§ 38.2-
4614 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
166. H.B. 2147 Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1993).
167. Id.
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
169. Act of Mar. 19, 1993, ch. 370, 1993 Va. Acts 535 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7.1
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-12 (Cum. Supp. 1993) (limiting amounts of land trustees may
hold).
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-8 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
172. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-16 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
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M. Wet Settlement Act
The General Assembly amended two sections of the Wet Settle-
ment Act.17 3 Code of Virginia section 6.1-2.11-14 was altered to ex-
tend the act to cover all loans secured by first mortgages or deeds
of trust on real estate containing no more than four residential
units. Code of Virginia section 6.1-2.121 5 now provides that in loan
refinancings and other loans where the borrower has a right of re-
scission, 'the lender must disburse loan proceeds within one busi-
ness day following the expiration of the rescission period provided
for in the United States Truth-in-Lending Act.176
N. Zoning, Land Use and Planning
The code section governing adoption of comprehensive plans by
all localities in the Commonwealth was amended to require the lo-
cal commission to consider affordable housing "sufficient to meet
the current and future needs of all levels of income in the locality
while considering the current and future needs of the planning dis-
trict within which the locality is situated.' ' 7 7 Logically, Code of
Virginia section 15.1-447,'78 governing surveys and studies to be
made in preparation of a comprehensive plan, was amended to in-
corporate the concept of affordable housing suitable for meeting
the needs of both the locality and its planning district. Code of
Virginia section 15.1-489 was amended, adding the promotion and
creation of affordable housing suitable for the current and future
needs of the locality, and the reasonable proportioning of the cur-
rent and future needs of the locality's planning district to the vari-
ous other "purposes" for which zoning ordinances may be
enacted. 7 9
173. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-2.10 to -2.15 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
174. Act of Mar. 24, 1993, ch. 530, 1993 Va. Acts 1113 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-
2.11 (Interim Supp. 1993)).
175. Act of Mar. 24, 1993, ch. 530, 1993 Va. Acts 1113 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-2-
12 (Cure. Supp. 1993)).
176. 15 'U.S.C. § § 1601-93 (Supp. 1993).
177. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 758, 1993 Va. Acts 1703 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-
466.1:7 (Cure. Supp. 1993)).
178. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 758, 1993 Va. Acts 1703 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-
477(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
179. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 758, 1993 Va. Acts 1704 (codified at VA CODE ANN. § 15.1-
489 (Cure. Supp. 1993)).
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Persons running afoul of zoning ordinances were provided proce-
dural relief when the General Assembly revised Code of Virginia
section 15.1-496.1.180 The section now requires, notwithstanding
any charter provision to the contrary, any written notice of a zon-
ing violation or an order from the zoning administrator to include
a statement informing the addressee that he may have a right to
appeal within thirty days, and that the decision or order will be
final and unappealable if not appealed within that time frame.
The General Assembly enlarged the power of zoning administra-
tors. Code of Virginia section 15.1-4911" now provides that, pursu-
ant to his authority to enforce and administer the zoning ordi-
nance, the administrator has "the authority to make conclusions of
law and findings of fact, with concurrence of the attorney for the
governing body, in connection with the administration, application
and enforcement of the ordinance in specific cases, including deter-
minations of rights accruing under § 15.1-492. ' 182
180. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 780, 1993 Va. Acts 1793 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-
496.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
181. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 672, 1993 Va. Acts 1594 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-
491 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
182. Act. of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 672, 1993 Va. Acts 1594 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-
491(d) (Cum. Supp. 1993)). Code of Virginia section 15.1-492 concerns vested rights and
non-conforming uses. VA. CODE ANN. § 151.1-492 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
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